Strange Judicial Opinions

I Thought that We Would Never See A Judge as Tolerant as Thee

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With several rhyming judges having fun with people’s cases, one must wonder what the judges would do if the shoe was on the other foot–if lawyers submitted rhyming court documents in a case, perhaps a poetic brief. Now we know! Well, at least with regard to one tolerant judge.

In Mackensworth v. American Trading Transportation Co., a judge responded as a good sport to some poetic pleadings submitted by counsel. For reasons unknown, the plaintiff’s lawyer submitted a poetic reply brief, stirring defense counsel to reply poetically as well.

U.S. District Judge Edward R. Becker decided to be a good sport and join in the fun. Although not set out in this excerpt, the West headnote writers once again had a good rhyme time with the case. Here are some excerpts from Judge Becker’s order:

The motion now before us has stirred up a terrible fuss.

And what is considerably worse, it has spawned some preposterous doggerel verse.

The plaintiff, a man of the sea,

after paying his lawyer a fee,

filed a complaint of several pages to recover statutory wages.

The pleaded facts remind us of a tale that is endless.

A seaman whom for centuries the law has called “friendless”

is discharged from the ship before voyage’s end

and sues for lost wages, his finances to mend.

***

 

Plaintiff’s counsel, whose name is Harry Lore,

read defendant’s brief and found it a bore.

Instead of a reply brief, he acted pretty quick

and responded with a clever limerick:

“Admiralty process is hoary

With pleadings that tell a sad story

Of Libels in Rem-

The bane of sea-faring men

The moral:

Better personally served than be sorry.”

 

Not to be outdone, the defense took the time

to reply with their own clever rhyme.

The defense counsel team of Mahoney, Roberts, & Smith

drafted a poem cutting right to the pith:

 

“Admiralty lawyers like Harry

Both current and those known from lore

Be they straight types, mixed or fairy

Must learn how to sidestep our bore.

For Smith, not known for his mirth

With his knife out for Mackensworth

With Writs, papers or Motions to Quash

Knows that dear Harry’s position don’t wash.”

 

Overwhelmed by this outburst of pure creativity,

we determined to show an equal proclivity.

Hence this opinion in the form of verse,

even if not of the calibre of Saint-John Perse.

[Court proceeds to wax poetic about long arm jurisdiction, concluding with:]

Finding that service of process is bona fide,

the motion to dismiss is hereby denied.

So that this case can now get about its ways,

defendant shall file an answer within 21 days.

— Mackensworth v. Am. Trading Transp. Co., 367 F. Supp. 373, 374–75, 377 (E.D. Pa. 1973). Thanks to Lihwei Lin.

The Haunting of Bankruptcy Law

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It must have been a slow day in the bankruptcy courts of South Florida when Judge A. Jay Cristol took pen in hand to address the case of In re Love. The West headnote at the end is funny.  But first, Judge Cristol’s take on Edgar Allan Poe’s haunting poem, The Raven, as applied to bankruptcy law:

Once upon a midnight dreary, while I pondered weak and weary

Over many quaint and curious files of chapter seven lore

While I nodded nearly napping, suddenly there came a tapping

As of some one gently rapping, rapping at my chamber door,

“Tis some debtor” I muttered, “tapping at my chamber door—

Only this and nothing more.”

Ah distinctly I recall, it was in the early fall

And the file still was small

The Code provided I could use it

If someone tried to substantially abuse it

No party asked that it be heard.

“Sua sponte” whispered a small black bird.

The bird himself, my only maven, strongly looked to be a raven.

Upon the words the bird had uttered

I gazed at all the files cluttered

“Sua sponte,” I recall, had no meaning; none at all.

And the cluttered files sprawl, drove a thought into my brain.

Eagerly I wished the morrow—vainly I had sought to borrow

From BAFJA, surcease of sorrow—

and an order quick and plain

That this case would not remain

as a source of further pain.

The procedure, it seemed plain.

As the case grew older, I perceived I must be bolder.

And must sua sponte act, to determine every fact,

If primarily consumer debts, are faced,

Perhaps this case is wrongly placed.

This is a thought that I must face, perhaps

I should dismiss this case.

I moved sua sponte to dismiss it

for I knew I would not miss it

The Code said I could, I knew it.

But not exactly how to do it, or perhaps some day I’d rue it.

I leaped up and struck my gavel.

For the mystery to unravel

Could I? Should I? Sua sponte, grant my motion to dismiss? While it seemed the thing to do, suddenly I thought of this.

Looking, looking towards the future and to what there was to see

If my motion, it was granted and an appeal came to be,

Who would be the appellee?

Surely, it would not be me.

Who would file, but pray tell me,

a learned brief for the appellee

The District Judge would not do so

At least this much I do know.

Tell me raven, how to go.

As I with the ruling wrestled

In the statute I saw nestled

A presumption with a flavor clearly in the debtor’s favor.

No evidence had I taken

Sua sponte appeared foresaken.

Now my motion caused me terror

A dismissal would be error.

Upon consideration of § 707(b), in anguish, loud I cried

The court’s sua sponte motion to dismiss under 707(b) is denied.

Give credit to the headnote writers at West. The job must be pretty boring, but they never miss a chance to spice it up a bit. Here’s the West Reporter headnote for the case:

Bankruptcy 48

Sua sponte dismissal would be error,

Though authority in Code is there,

To eschew abuse of consumer debt,

As presumption for debtor must be met.

— In re Love, 61 B.R. 558, 558–559 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1986). Thanks to Professor Glenn E. Pasvogel.

Rhymin’ Eakin

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Pennsylvania Judge Mike Eakin is a poetic soul who specializes in opinions that rhyme.

In Zangrando v. Sipula, Zangrando was walking her miniature poodles, Angel and Autumn, when Sipula struck one of the dogs with his car. Zangrando sued Sipula for payment of the vet bills. Here’s a short excerpt from Judge Eakin’s rhyming decision, affirming the trial court’s award of damages:

The car was coming much too close, something inside told her; the next thing Mrs. Zangrando knew, a poodle flew over her shoulder.

To appellee this was nothing short of an unmitigated disaster; the wingless Angel’d taken flight and ascended quickly past her.

 In this brace of miniature poodles, neither one wide nor tall; one may have been named Autumn, but t’was Angel took the fall.

Don’t worry. Poor little Angel recovered from her injuries. A fundamental rule of writing rhyming judicial opinions—of which there are many in the annals of law—is that the injury be slight. The opinion wouldn’t be as amusing if it rhymed: “When the doggie got squashed under the SUV’s wheels; it put a quick end to his plaintive squeals.”

— Zangrando v. Sipula, 756 A.2d 73, 75 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000). Thanks to Professor Coleen Barger.

More Rhymin’ Eakin

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Here are a couple more rhyming opinions from Pennsylvania Judge Mike Eakin:

In Busch v. Busch, he upheld a pre-nuptial agreement with the observation, “They wanted to marry, their lives to enhance, not for the dollars—it was for the romance. When they said, ‘I do,’ had their wedding day kiss, it was not about money—only marital bliss.”

In Liddle v. Scholze, he rejected a contract claim by a buyer of emus (Liddle) against the seller (Scholze) after the emus (Nicholas and Savannah) failed to propogate. He blamed the emus: “The fault’s the emus’, not that of Liddle, or Scholze, or the court placed in the middle. Fruitless in Pennsylvania and Louisiana, the blame’s on Nicholas and Savannah.”

— Busch v. Busch, 732 A.2d 1274, 1278 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999); Liddle v. Scholze, 768 A.2d 1183, 1186 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001).

“Could You Love Me a Little Less, Judge?” (Kent)

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Another ad hominem-laced love letter to lawyers from former U.S. District Judge Samuel Kent, Galveston, TX. This one was a maritime personal injury case in which defense counsel moved for summary judgment on behalf of his client Phillips Petroleum.

Note that, in insulting the lawyers throughout, Judge Kent emphasized that the lawyers for both sides were “likeable” and that he had “affection” for them:

[Judge Kent begins the order by stating the case, then proceeds as follows.]

[T]he Court notes that this case involves two extremely likable lawyers, who have together delivered some of the most amateurish pleadings ever to cross the hallowed causeway into Galveston, an effort which leads the Court to surmise but one plausible explanation. Both attorneys have obviously entered into a secret pact—complete with hats, handshakes and cryptic words—to draft their pleadings entirely in crayon on the back sides of gravy-stained paper place mats, in the hope that the Court would be so charmed by their child-like efforts that their utter dearth of legal authorities in their briefing would go unnoticed.

Whatever actually occurred, the Court is now faced with the daunting task of deciphering their submissions. With Big Chief tablet readied, thick black pencil in hand, and a devil-may-care laugh in the face of death, life on the razor’s edge sense of exhilaration, the Court begins.

[The court discusses summary judgment law, followed by several caustic remarks about the quality of defense counsel’s (representing Phillips) filings, including the statement that “[a] more bumbling approach is difficult to conceive.” Then the court tears into plaintiff’s counsel.]

Plaintiff responds to this deft, yet minimalist analytical wizardry with an equally gossamer wisp of an argument, although Plaintiff does at least cite the federal limitations provision applicable to maritime tort claims. … Naturally, Plaintiff also neglects to provide any analysis whatsoever of why his claim versus Defendant Phillips is a maritime action. Instead, Plaintiff “cites” to a single case from the Fourth Circuit.

Plaintiff’s citation, however, points to a nonexistent Volume “1886” of the Federal Reporter Third Edition and neglects to provide a pinpoint citation for what, after being located, turned out to be a forty-page decision. Ultimately, to the Court’s dismay after reviewing the opinion, it stands simply for the bombshell proposition that torts committed on navigable waters … require the application of general maritime rather than state tort law … The Court cannot even begin to comprehend why this case was selected for reference. It is almost as if Plaintiff’s counsel chose the opinion by throwing long range darts at the Federal Reporter (remarkably enough hitting a nonexistent volume!). …

Despite the continued shortcomings of Plaintiff’s supplemental submission, the Court commends Plaintiff for his vastly improved choice of crayon—Brick Red is much easier on the eyes than Goldenrod, and stands out much better amidst the mustard splotched about Plaintiff’s briefing. But at the end of the day, even if you put a calico dress on it and call it Florence, a pig is still a pig. Now, alas, the Court must return to grownup land. [Court resolves issue on its own.] …

Take heed and be suitably awed, oh boys and girls—the Court was able to state the issue and its resolution in one paragraph … despite dozens of pages of gibberish from the parties to the contrary! …

After this remarkably long walk on a short legal pier, having received no useful guidance whatever from either party, the Court has endeavored, primarily based upon its affection for both counsel, but also out of its own sense of morbid curiosity, to resolve what it perceived to be the legal issue presented. Despite the waste of perfectly good crayon seen in both parties’ briefing … the Court believes it has satisfactorily resolved this matter. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED …

— Bradshaw v. Unity Marine Corp., 147 F. Supp. 2d 668, 670–72 (S.D. Tex. 2001). Thanks to Ira Rosenau.

More Judicial Distemper-ment (Kent)

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Some believe the writings of impeached U.S. District Judge Samuel B. Kent, Southern District of Texas, are quite funny, but probably not many lawyers in Galveston were laughing after his June 2001 order on a motion to transfer for improper venue. Being Juge Kent, he couldn’t just deny the motion. He had to rip apart the lawyer who filed the motion:

[A]ny person with even a correspondence-course level understanding of federal practice and procedure would recognize that Defendant’s Motion is patently insipid, ludicrous and utterly unequivocally without any merit whatsoever. Worse, it is just plain blatantly wrong in light of the unambiguous language of a decades old federal statute and veritable mountains of case law addressing venue propriety.

Sound bad? It gets worse. Judge Kent went on to state that “Defendant’s obnoxiously ancient, boilerplate, inane Motion is emphatically DENIED.”

For the coup de grace, Judge Kent ended by disqualifying the lawyer from further appearing in the case “for submitting this asinine tripe.”

— Labor Force, Inc. v. Jacintoport Corp., 144 F. Supp. 2d 740 (S.D. Tex. 2001) (opinion subsequently withdrawn from bound volume).

Only Judge Kent Could Insult Six Nations in One Paragraph (Kent)

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Here’s another widely circulated sarcastic opinion from former U.S. District Judge Samuel Kent, Galveston, Texas. Say what you want about Kent, and there is plenty to say, he was a clever writer.  And who else could insult six entire nations in a single paragraph (the first one below)?

The governments of several foreign countries sued American tobacco companies for health care costs allegedly caused by the defendants’ product. Judge Kent, in his inimitable way, sua sponte transferred the case to the District of Columbia:

The governments of Guatemala, Panama, Nicaragua, Thailand, Venezuela, and Bolivia have filed suit in [several geographically diverse locales in the U.S.] Why none of these countries seems to have a court system their own governments have confidence in is a mystery to this Court. Moreover, given the tremendous number of United States jurisdictions encompassing fascinating and exotic places, the Court can hardly imagine why the Republic of Bolivia elected to file suit in the veritable hinterlands of Brazoria County, Texas. The Court seriously doubts whether Brazoria County has ever seen a live Bolivian … even on the Discovery Channel.

Though only here by removal, this humble Court by the sea is certainly flattered by what must be the worldwide renown of rural Texas courts for dispensing justice with unparalleled fairness and alacrity, apparently in common discussion even on the mountain peaks of Bolivia! Still, the Court would be remiss in accepting an obligation for which it truly does not have the necessary resources …

[T]he capacity of this Court to address the complex and sophisticated issues of international law and foreign relations presented by this case is dwarfed by that of its esteemed colleagues in the District of Columbia who deftly address such awesome tasks as a matter of course. … Such a Bench, well-populated with genuinely renowned intellects, can certainly better bear and share the burden of multidistrict litigation than this single judge division, where the judge moves his lips when he reads ….

[I]t is the Court’s opinion that the District of Columbia, located in this Nation’s capital, is a much more logical venue for the parties and witnesses in this action because, among other things, Plaintiff has an embassy in Washington, D.C., and thus a physical presence and governmental representatives there, whereas there isn’t even a Bolivian restaurant anywhere near here! Although the jurisdiction of this Court boasts no similar foreign offices, a somewhat dated globe is within its possession.

While the Court does not therefrom profess to understand all of the political subtleties of the geographical transmogrifications ongoing in Eastern Europe, the Court is virtually certain that Bolivia is not within the four counties over which this Court presides, even though the words Bolivia and Brazoria are a lot alike and caused some real, initial confusion until the Court conferred with its law clerks. Thus, it is readily apparent, even from an outdated globe such as that possessed by this Court, that Bolivia, a hemisphere away, ain’t in south-central Texas, and that, at the very least, the District of Columbia is a more appropriate venue (though Bolivia isn’t located there either).

Furthermore, as this Judicial District bears no significant relationship to any of the matters at issue, and the judge of this Court simply loves cigars, the Plaintiff can be expected to suffer neither harm nor prejudice by a transfer to Washington, D.C., a Bench better able to rise to the smoky challenges presented by this case, despite the alleged and historic presence there of countless “smoke-filled” rooms.

— Republic of Bolivia v. Philip Morris Cos., 39 F. Supp. 2d 1008, 1009–10 (S.D. Tex. 1999). Thanks to Bob Van Voris.

Galveston Pride (Kent)

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The notorious Judge Samuel Kent, former U.S. District Judge for the Southern District of Texas, made his first big spash on the Strange Judicial Opinions screen in a 1996 case called Smith v. Colonial Penn Ins. Co.

A defendant in a breach of contract case in Galveston apparently insulted Judge Kent’s hometown and Southern pride when it filed a motion to transfer venue in the case from Galveston to Houston based on forum non conveniens. Defendant’s motion said Galveston did not have a commercial airport into which defendant’s agents could fly. The nearest airport was Houston’s Hobby Airport, 40 miles away.

Judge Kent was somethingless than sympathetic to defendant’s plight. He sarcastically skewered the lawyers (some paragraph breaks inserted):

Defendant should be assured that it is not embarking on a three-week-long trip via covered wagons when it travels to Galveston. Rather, Defendant will be pleased to discover that the highway is paved and lighted all the way to Galveston, and thanks to the efforts of this Court’s predecessor, Judge Roy Bean, the trip should be free of rustlers, hooligans, or vicious varmints of unsavory kind. Moreover, the speed limit was recently increased to seventy miles per hour on most of the road leading to Galveston, so Defendant should be able to hurtle to justice at lightning speed.

To assuage Defendant’s worries about the inconvenience of the drive, the Court notes that Houston’s Hobby Airport is located about equal drivetime from downtown Houston and the Galveston courthouse. Defendant will likely find it an easy, traffic-free ride to Galveston as compared to a congested, construction-riddled drive to downtown Houston. The Court notes that any inconvenience suffered in having to drive to Galveston may likely be offset by the peacefulness of the ride and the scenic beauty of the sunny isle.

As to Defendant’s argument that Houston might also be a more convenient forum for Plaintiff, the Court notes that Plaintiff picked Galveston as her forum of choice even though she resides in San Antonio. Defendant argues that flight travel is available between Houston and San Antonio but is not available between Galveston and San Antonio, again because of the absence of a commercial airport. Alas, this Court’s kingdom for a commercial airport! [Fn]

[Fn.] Defendant will again be pleased to know that regular limousine service is available from Hobby Airport, even to the steps of this humble courthouse, which has got lights, indoor plummin’, ‘lectric doors, and all sorts of new stuff, almost like them big courthouses back East.

The Court is unpersuaded by this argument because it is not this Court’s concern how Plaintiff gets here, whether it be by plane, train, automobile, horseback, foot, or on the back of a huge Texas jackrabbit, as long as Plaintiff is here at the proper date and time. Thus, the Court declines to disturb the forum chosen by the Plaintiff and introduce the likelihood of delay inherent in any transfer simply to avoid the insignificant inconvenience that Defendant may suffer by litigating this matter in Galveston rather than Houston.

And that’s how Lawhaha.com first met Judge Kent.

— Smith v. Colonial Penn Ins. Co., 943 F. Supp. 782, 784–85 (S.D. Tex. 1996).

Proof Judges Can Do Anything They Want

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In Fisher v. Lowe, the plaintiff sued defendant for driving his automobile into plaintiff’s oak tree, damaging the tree. The Michigan trial court ruled in favor of the defendant and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Here is the court’s actual opinion:

We thought that we would never see

A suit to compensate a tree.

A suit whose claim in tort is prest

Upon a mangled tree’s behest;

A tree whose battered trunk was prest

Against a Chevy’s crumpled crest;

A tree that faces each new day

With bark and limb in disarray;

A tree that may forever bear

A lasting need for tender care.

Flora lovers though we three,

We must uphold the court’s decree.

Affirmed.

The court’s opinion prompted the usually staid headnote writers at West Publishing Co. to take their own poetic license. This one’s worth checking out in full.

— Fisher v. Lowe, 333 N.W.2d 67, 67 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983).

Poor Poor “Poopi” the Poodle

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pet malpracticePoopi the poodle and her owners sued their veterinarian after Poopi underwent anesthesia for teeth cleaning and woke up with a three-inch scar on her abdomen. The vet mistakenly tried to spay Poopi, even though she had already been spayed as a puppy.

Poopi’s owners sought emotional distress damages for themselves as well as for Poopi, including expenses for Poopi’s psychological care. Plaintiffs conceded that under Ohio law dogs are considered to be personal property, but argued that the court should “do the right thing” by distinguishing pets from inanimate objects. They quoted from a law review article that equated the death of a “companion animal” to “the wrongful killing of any other family member.”

The Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed the trial judge, which had rejected the claim, although one member of the appellate panel concurred “reluctantly” and suggested that the legislature consider allowing damages for tortious injuries to pets.

Now that the suit has been wrapped up, perhaps Poopi should consult independent counsel about the possibility of pursuing emotional distress of having to go through life named “Poopi.”

— Oberschlake v. Veterinary Assoc. Animal Hosp., 785 N.E.2d 811 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003).