Paranoia Will Destroy Ya

freak out at phish concertThe Kinks got it right in their song, “Destroyer,” when they sang that paranoia will destroy ya.

It certainly did so for the defendant in a case where, after getting paranoid at a 1999 Phish concert in Oswega, NY, presumably while under the influence of an hallucinogenic drug, he became convinced the police were following him and that the band was sending him messages through the music. Fleeing the concert, he traveled 250 miles on foot and by hitch-hiking, convinced the police were after him the whole way. (He believed that every car with an “A” in the license number contained police officers.)

Some thirty-six hours later, he finally turned up at the police barracks in Westport, NY, where he told an investigator, “You know who I am.” When the cops didn’t know who he was or why he was there, he told them he was growing marijuana plants back at his home in Rochester, NH. He then consented to a search of the house.

When the cops in Rochester searched the house, they found marijuana plants and liquid acid. Though a New Hampshire Superior Court ultimately ruled that the evidence should be suppressed (because of insufficient proof the defendant received and waived his Miranda rights), the University of Memphis law student who sent me this opinion correctly opined that it should serve as “a gentle reminder to any students planning to reunite with Phish over the summer break.”

— State v. Augur, Case Nos. 01-S-388, 01-S-389, 2001 N.H. Super. LEXIS 17 (N.H. Super. Ct., Oct. 22, 2001). Thanks to Adam Ragan.

The Judge Who Rhymed for a Reason

In Brown v. State, Judge Randall Evans, Jr. not only wrote one of the earliest in the long line of rhyming judicial opinions, he did it for a good reason. As he explained in a footnote:

This opinion is placed in rhyme because approximately one year ago, in Savannah at a very convivial celebration, the distinguished Judge Dunbar Harrison … arose and addressed those assembled, and demanded that if [I] ever again was so presumptuous as to reverse one of his decisions, that the opinion be written in poetry.

This back story puts the opinion a cut above the usual rhyming opinion. You gotta love a judge who takes on such a challenge from a colleague after a couple of drinks (I assume that’s what “a very convivial celebration” means) and honors it.

To his further credit, Justice Evans conceded he is “not a poet, and the language used, at best, is mere doggerel” and also insisted that it’s really hard to write a rhyming judicial opinion. Here’s a taste of the opinion (several verses omitted, but I tried to keep the general thread). But the funniest part is that he wrote it at all. He even specifically mentions Judge Harrison:

 The D. A. was ready

His case was red-hot.

Defendant was present,

His witness was not.

He prayed one day’s delay

From His honor the judge.

But his plea was not granted

The Court would not budge.

So the jury was empaneled

All twelve good and true

But without his main witness

What could the twelve do?

…

‘What verdict, Mr. Foreman?’

The learned judge inquired.

‘Guilty, your honor.’

On Brown’s face—no smile.

‘Stand up’ said the judge,

Then quickly announced

‘Seven years at hard labor’

Thus his sentence pronounced.

‘This trial was not fair,‘

The defendant then sobbed.

‘With my main witness absent

I’ve simply been robbed.’

‘I want a new trial—

State has not fairly won.’

‘New trial denied,‘

Said Judge Dunbar Harrison.

…

So the case has reached us—

And now we must decide

Was the guilty verdict legal—

Or should we set it aside?

…

Was one day’s delay

Too much to expect?

Could the State refuse it

With all due respect?

…

We’ve considered this case

Through the night—

through the day.

As Judge Harrison said,

‘We must earn our poor pay.’

This case was once tried—

But should now be rehearsed

And tried one more time.

This case is reversed.

— Brown v. State, 216 S.E.2d 356 (Ga. Ct. App. 1975)

Saved by a Gator with a 455 Cubic-Inch Engine

drunk driving airboat
All the horsepower without the sharp teeth or drunk-driving convictions.

Things weren’t looking good for the defendant in State v. Stagno after getting pulled over by a state trooper. With a blood alcohol level of .197 and two DUI convictions in the past ten years, he almost certainly would’ve lost his driver’s license if he’d been driving his friends to the topless bar in his car.

But thanks to a drunken bet made earlier in the evening, the defendant’s mode of transportation on this wild night out was not a car at all—it was a “fifteen-foot 1985 Air Gator airboat, powered by a 455 cubic inch Buick engine.”

Because the applicable statute allowed judges to revoke driver’s licenses only when the vehicle driven required a license, the trial court had to settle for imposing a $1,000 fine, thirty days in jail, and alcohol rehabilitation counseling.

The Alaska Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s ruling, agreeing that a fifteen-foot airboat is not a motor vehicle requiring a driver’s license.

— State v. Stagno, 739 P.2d 198 (Alaska Ct. App. 1987)

A Kozinski DISS-sent (Kozinski)

In U.S. v. Ramirez Lopez, the defendant was convicted of smuggling aliens into the U.S. from Mexico. One died during the journey due to inclement weather. When border patrol agents interviewed fourteen members of the group, two of them said the defendant was the guide of the expedition while the other twelve exculpated him, denying he was the guide.

The government deported nine of the twelve exculpatory witnesses back to Mexico prior to trial and the trial judge denied admission of the government’s interview notes with them.

It’s fair to say Judge Kozinski was unimpressed by the fairness of the procedure. He began his dissent from the affirmance of the conviction with a satirical, fictional post-trial conversation between the defendant and his lawyer:

Lawyer: Juan, I have good news and bad news.

Ramirez-Lopez: OK, I’m ready. Give me the bad news first.

Lawyer: The bad news is that the Ninth Circuit affirmed your conviction and you’re going to spend many years in federal prison.

Ramirez-Lopez: Oh, man, that’s terrible. I’m so disappointed. But you said there’s good news too, right?

Lawyer: Yes, excellent news! I’m very excited.

Ramirez-Lopez: OK, I’m ready for some good news, let me have it.

Lawyer: Well, here it goes: You’ll be happy to know that you had a perfect trial. They got you fair and square!

[Colloquy continues in which the defendant questions the fairness of the trial and the judge explains the harmless error rule as “No harm, no foul.” The defendant takes issue with the “no harm” part, pointing out he had twelve witnesses who said he wasn’t the guide, but the government sent nine of them back to Mexico. The lawyer assures him the government talked to all of them and took good notes about what each one said.]

Ramirez-Lopez: No kidding, man. They did all that for me?

Lawyer: They sure did. Is this a great country or what?

Ramirez-Lopez: OK, I see it now, but there’s one thing that still confuses me.

Lawyer: What’s that, Juan?

Ramirez-Lopez: You see, the government took all those great notes to help me, just so we’d know what all those guys said.

Lawyer: Right, I saw them, and they were very good notes. Clear, specific, detailed. Good grammar and syntax. All told, I’d say those were some great notes.

Ramirez-Lopez: And twelve of those guys all said I wasn’t the guide.

Lawyer: Absolutely! Our government never hides the ball. The government of Iraq or Afghanistan or one of those places might do this, but not ours. If twelve guys said you weren’t the guide, everybody knows about it.

Ramirez-Lopez: Except the jury. I was there at the trial, and I remember the jury never saw the notes. And the officers who testified never told the jury that twelve of the fourteen guys that were with me said I wasn’t the guide.

Lawyer: Right.

Ramirez-Lopez: Isn’t the jury supposed to have all the facts?

Lawyer: Not all the facts. Some facts are cumulative, others are hearsay. Some facts are both cumulative and hearsay.

Ramirez-Lopez: Can you say that in plain English?

Lawyer: No.

Ramirez-Lopez: The jury was supposed to decide whether I was the guide or not, right? Don’t you think they might have had a reasonable doubt if they’d heard that twelve of the fourteen guys in my party said it wasn’t me?

Lawyer: He-he-he! You’d think that only if you didn’t go to law school. Lawyers and judges know better. It makes no difference at all to the jury whether one witness says it or a dozen witnesses say it. In fact, if you put on too many witnesses, they might get mad at you and send you to prison just for wasting their time. So the government did you a big favor by removing those nine witnesses before they could screw up your case.

Ramirez-Lopez: I see what you mean. But how about the notes? Surely the jury would have gotten a different picture if they had just seen the notes of nine guys saying I wasn’t the guide. That wouldn’t have taken too long.

Lawyer: Wrong again, Juan! Those notes were hearsay and in this country we don’t admit hearsay.

Ramirez-Lopez: How come?

Lawyer: The guys writing down what the witnesses said could have made a mistake.

Ramirez-Lopez: You mean, like maybe one of those twelve guys said, “Juan was the guide,” and the guy from Immigration made a mistake and wrote down, “Juan was not the guide”?

Lawyer: Exactly.

Ramirez-Lopez: You’re right again, it probably happened just that way. I bet those guys from Immigration wrote down, “Juan wasn’t the guide,” even when the witnesses said loud and clear I was the guide-just to be extra fair to me.

Lawyer: Absolutely, that’s the kind of guys they are.

Ramirez-Lopez: You’re very lucky to be working with guys like that.

Lawyer: Amen to that. I thank my lucky stars every Sunday in church.

Ramirez-Lopez: I feel a lot better now that you’ve explained it to me. This is really a pretty good system you have here. What do you call it?

Lawyer: Due process. We’re very proud of it.

This is the kind of intelligent humor–using humor or satire as a rhetorical device to make a point–that Lawhaha.com values, and a reason Judge K is in the Strange Judicial Opinions Hall of Fame.

— United States v. Ramirez Lopez, 315 F.3d 1143, 1159–62 (9th Cir. 2003) (Kozinski, J., dissenting). Thanks to Steven Druckenmiller.

How to Get Disbarred in Five Easy Steps

It’s actually pretty hard to get disbarred as a lawyer, as opposed to reprimanded or suspended, maybe harder than it should be. But with enough effort, it can be done, as shown in a 2010 case where the Kansas Supreme Court disbarred a lawyer after what it called repeated episodes “of rude, disruptive, and at times criminal, misconduct.”

According to the court’s findings (the lawyer disputed the facts), these incidents included:

 1. Yelling at a court clerk to tell a prosecutor “to get his ‘ass’ in the courtroom,” telling the clerk he was smarter than anyone in the clerk’s office, and telling all the clerks present that they were “f****** b******.”

 2. Getting in a physical altercation with a Deputy Marshal at the federal courthouse after he refused to obey commands to return to the security entrance after setting off the magnetometer, for which the lawyer was subsequently indicted and convicted.

 3. Repeatedly talking loudly and abusively to the judge in a Missouri case, saying, among other things: “that the proceeding was a ‘joke’ and a ‘travesty’”; accusing the judge of “apparent reckless, bias, [and] prejudice”; telling the judge that the “proceeding was a joke”; accusing the court of “corrupting and stinking up the case” and “corrupting the system”; accusing the court of “being anything but impartial, justiciable, and anything but incompetent”; wadding up a copy of a pleading filed by opposing counsel, throwing it to the floor, and grinding it into the floor with his shoe; and stating to the court that “you’re going to sit up there with the audacity and the smugness of your holiness.” For these acts, he was held in contempt of court.

4. Changing a previously agreed on fee agreement from a $3,500 flat fee to an hourly rate of $3,500.

5. Getting into an argument with a court bailiff in another case, as a result of which he was held in contempt of court. Among other conduct, he accused the court of being a “kangaroo court” and said that “all you guys in Grandview [Missouri] are all snakes, that’s all you all are.” The bailiff reported that during this fracas, the lawyer’s client was overheard saying “That’s my attorney and I don’t want to have anything to do with him.”

— In re Romious, 240 P.3d 945, 947 (Kan. 2010). Thanks to Doug Cressler.

Fight Club: Doctors vs. Lawyers

fight club doctors vs. lawyersAndrew Jay McClurg, Fight Club: Doctors vs. Lawyers―A Peace Plan Grounded in Self Interest, 83 Temple Law Review 101-58 (2011).

Doctors and lawyers have been at odds since the first medical malpractice “crisis” occurred in the mid-nineteenth century. As one professor said, it is axiomatic these days that “doctors hate lawyers,” which is curious in one sense given that social psychology “liking” research suggests they should get along well in light of their similar backgrounds and socioeconomic status.

Their modern fight plays out publicly in a variety of forums, principally the national tort reform movement. Like professional wrestlers, the fighters sometimes resort to dirty tactics. It is an unseemly, embarrassing spectacle for what traditionally have been considered the two most prestigious professions. Given the importance of the healthcare and legal systems they serve, the doctor-lawyer conflict has implications for all Americans. Previous calls for doctors and lawyers to improve their relationship have been met with scorn.

This article takes a different tack in calling for improved relations: an appeal to self-interest. It argues that doctors and lawyers have shared tangible and intangible interests in reducing their conflict and improving communication. The article also sets forth several steps toward accomplishing those goals, including the need for each side to acknowledge certain core, uncomfortable truths about our medical liability system. It begins with a brief history of the doctor-lawyer fight and an explanation of why the two groups dislike each other so much.

Throughout, doctors and lawyers are compared on a variety of measuring scales such as total numbers, educational debt load, income, public approval ratings, jokes concerning, job satisfaction, political leanings, substance abuse, and suicide rates.

Neurotic, Paranoid Wimps―Nothing has Changed

1L storiesAndrew Jay McClurg, Neurotic, Paranoid Wimps―Nothing has Changed, 78 University of Missouri-Kansas City Law Review 1049-61 (2010).

In an issue of the UMKC Law Review devoted to “1L Stories” and intended as a tribute to Scott Turow’s classic book, One L, the author recounts his own first-year tales of neurotic, paranoid wimpism (descriptors from Amazon.com reviews of Turow’s book). Turow wrote the foreword for the issue.

The author’s narrative asserts that a dominant theme of One L, the story of Turow’s first year at Harvard Law School, was negative affect. Turow talked of anxiety, fear, stress, panic, vulnerability, self-doubt, shame and grief, wounded self-esteem, unhappiness, paranoia, embarrassment, oppression, and insanity.

The author describes his similar experiences and asserts that, contrary to popular belief, things have not changed that much in legal education since his and Turow’s day.

Kiss and Tell: Protecting Relationship Privacy Through Contract Law

kiss and tellAndrew J. McClurg, Kiss and Tell: Protecting Intimate Relationship Privacy Through Implied Contracts of Confidentiality, 74 University of Cincinnati Law Review  887-940 (2006).

In today’s tell-all world, where anyone with internet access can become a “media outlet,” growing numbers of people are finding themselves the victims of former intimate partners who mass disseminate private, highly embarrassing information, including photos and videotapes, about or involving them.

In theory, tort law provides the perfect (and exclusive) remedy when one gives widespread publicity to embarrassing, non-newsworthy private facts about a person in a manner that reasonable persons would consider highly offensive. In practice, however, this claim—known as the tort of “public disclosure of private facts”—offers virtually no chance of recovery by plaintiffs. The tort sustained severe, possibly mortal wounds in a series of U.S. Supreme Court cases culminating in Florida Star v. B.J.F. (1989). In its current formulation, it is quite possible that the public disclosure tort is unconstitutional under the First Amendment.

The demise of the public disclosure tort has left a large gap in privacy protection for victims of offensive disclosures of private information. This Article proposes a theory to partially fill that gap in some public disclosure situations arising from intimate relationships. Specifically, expanding on an argument advanced by Professor Eugene Volokh that the only constitutionally permissible means for enforcing personal information privacy is contract law, the article argues that an implied contract of confidentiality arises in intimate relationships that the parties will not disseminate through an instrument of mass communication private, embarrassing information about the other acquired during the relationship.

Dead Sorrow: Loss and Wrongful Death Damages

dead sorrowAndrew J. McClurg, Dead Sorrow: A Story About Loss and A New Theory of Wrongful Death Damages, 85 Boston University Law Review 1-51 (2005).

This “scholarative”–combining personal narrative and traditional doctrinal scholarship–tells the story of a personal loss as a prelude for arguing for a new theory of wrongful death damages.

When a tortiously caused death occurs, five losses/injuries result: (1) the decedent’s life itself; (2) the trauma and bereavement suffered by the decedent’s survivors, collectively referred to in this article as “grief;” (3) the pecuniary value of financial and service contributions that the decedent could have been expected to make to his or her dependents; (4) the loss of the decedent’s society and companionship, which in some states is considered a type of pecuniary loss under the fiction that society and companionship are a type of “lost service” with ascertainable monetary value (technically placing such damages in category 3) but which in other states is viewed as an intangible or noneconomic loss; and (5) the direct costs associated with the death, such as funeral expenses.

The wrongful death system fails to account for the first two elements. Current law attaches no monetary value to life itself. The second item, grief, traditionally has been the invisible injury from wrongful death. This article proposes a legislative reconceptualization of wrongful death damages that addresses both of the deficiencies described above—for one price. Specifically, it argues that life has independent value apart from what we earn and give to others and that this value should be recognized in the form of “lost life” damages.

Departing from the orthodox view that such damages should be allocated to the decedent’s estate or to the survivors, the article instead suggests that damages for the lost value of life be used for the exclusive purpose of establishing a lasting memorial to the decedent. Such a solution would promote both the economic deterrence and corrective justice models of tort law.

Additionally, the memorial established with the lost life damages would, at no additional cost, provide a proven grief-healing instrument for all persons who mourn the decedent’s passing. Finally, because it is recommended that memorials created with lost life damages be required to serve a utilitarian function, another unique aspect of the proposal is that it would allocate tort damages in ways that benefit society in addition to tort victims, enhancing the net social benefit of the tort system.

Sound-Bite Gun Fights: Presidential Debating About Firearms

presidential debates and firearmsAndrew J. McClurg, Sound-Bite Gun Fights: Three Decades of Presidential Debating About Firearms, 73 University of Missouri-Kansas City Law Review 1015-45 (2005).

In recent years, both major political parties have shied away from discussing gun control and gun rights during the presidential election cycle.

But it wasn’t always been that way. To the contrary, with all of the important issues affecting America and Americans—taxes, budget deficits, foreign policy, unemployment, abortion, energy policy, the environment, education, poverty, health care, terrorism, Social Security and Medicare, nuclear disarmament and proliferation, tort reform, big government, equal rights and others—gun control has been one of the most frequently asked-about subjects over the twenty-eight year period of presidential debating from 1976-2004. The issue formed the subject of specific debate questions in five of the nine presidential debate cycles during that period.

This essay explores how presidential candidates performed in the gun debate during that period on the biggest political stage of them all.

It reviews, largely from a rhetorical perspective, the presidential debates from 1976 to 2004 through the lens of firearms policy, collecting and commenting on each excerpt from the debates  pertaining to gun rights and gun control.